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Abstract
We introduce a new measure of the discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare
in a Nash equilibrium and in a social optimum, that we call selfishness level. It is the smallest
fraction of the social welfare that needs to be added to the players’ payoffs to ensure that a Nash
equilibrium of the resulting game is also its social optimum. This notion is unrelated to that of price
of stability. We compute the selfishness level for some selected games. In particular, the selfishness
level of finite ordinal potential games is finite, while that of a Cournot competition oligopoly game
and Tragedy of the Commons game is infinite. We also provide an estimate on the selfishness level
of linear congestion games and fair cost sharing games.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The discrepancy in strategic games between the social welfare in a Nash equilibrium and in a so-
cial optimum has been long recognized by the economists. One of the flagship examples is Cournot
competition, a strategic game involving firms that simultaneously choose the production levels of a
homogeneous product. The payoff functions in this game describe the firms’ profit in the presence
of some production costs, under the assumption that the price of the product depends negatively on
the total output. It is well-known, see, e.g., [3, Section 10.2], that the price in the social optimum is
strictly higher than in the Nash equilibrium, which shows that the competition between the producers
of a product drives its price down.
In computer science the above discrepancy led to the introduction of the notions of the price of
anarchy, see [10], and the price of stability, see [17], that measure the ratio between the social welfare
in a worst and, respectively, a best Nash equilibrium and a social optimum. This originated a huge
research effort aiming at determining both ratios for specific strategic games that possess (pure) Nash
equilibria.
These two notions are descriptive in the sense that they refer to an existing situation. In this
paper we propose another notion that measures the discrepancy between the social welfare in a Nash
equilibrium and a social optimum, which is normative, in the sense that it refers to a modified situation.
It draws on the concept of altruistic games (see, e.g., [11] and more recent [12]). In these games each
player’s payoff is modified so that it also depends positively on a fraction of the social welfare in the
considered joint strategy.
In our approach the minimal fraction for which such a modification of the original game yields the
price of stability 1 is viewed as the selfishness level of the game. That is, the selfishness level of a
game is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be offered to each player to achieve
that a social optimum is realized in a Nash equilibrium.
So in a finite game, if some Nash equilibrium of the game is also a social optimum, then its
selfishness level is 0. Otherwise if α > 0 is the smallest fraction of the social welfare that needs to be
added to the players’ payoffs to ensure that a Nash equilibrium of the resulting game is also its social
optimum, then the selfishness level is α . If such an α does not exist, then the selfishness level of the
game is ∞. For infinite games one needs additionally to consider the possibility that a minimum of a
set of αs may not exist.
1.2 Related work
On an abstract level, the proposed approach is discussed in [1], in chapter “How to Promote Coopera-
tion”, from where we cite (see page 134): “An excellent way to promote cooperation in a society is to
teach people to care about the welfare of others.”
There are only few articles in the algorithmic game theory literature that study the influence of
altruism in strategic games [7, 9, 8, 5, 6]. In these works, altruistic player behavior is modeled by
altering each player’s perceived payoff in order to account also for the welfare of others. The models
differ in the way they combine the player’s individual payoff with the payoffs of the other players.
All these studies are descriptive in the sense that they aim at understanding the impact of altruistic
behavior on specific strategic games.
Closest to our work are the articles [8] and [6]. Elias et al. [8] study the inefficiency of equilibria
in network design games with altruistic (or, as they call it, socially-aware) players. As we do here,
they define each player’s cost function as his individual cost plus α times the social cost. They derive
lower and upper bounds on the price of anarchy and the price of stability, respectively, of the modified
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game. In particular, they show that the price of stability is at most (Hn + α)/(1 + α), where n is the
number of players.
In an independent work, Chen et al. [6] introduce a framework to study the robust price of anarchy,
which refers to the worst-case inefficiency of more general solution concepts such as coarse correlated
equilibria (see [16]), of altruistic extensions of strategic games. In their model, player i’s perceived
cost is a convex combination of (1−βi) times his individual cost plus βi times the social cost, where
βi ∈ [0,1] is the altruism level of i. If all players have a uniform altruism level βi = β , this model
relates to the one we consider here by setting α = β/(1− β ). Although not being the main focus
of the paper, the authors also provide upper bounds of 2/(1 + β ) and (1−β )Hn + β on the price of
stability for linear congestion games and fair cost sharing games, respectively.
Note that in all three cases the price of stability approaches 1 as α goes to ∞. This seems to
suggest that that the selfishness level of these games is ∞. However, this is not the case: We derive
a characterization result that allows us to determine the selfishness level of a strategic game. Using
this characterization, we can show that the selfishness level of finite potential games is finite, thereby
showing that the selfishness level of the games mentioned above is finite. We also derive explicit
bounds on the selfishness level of linear congestion games and fair cost sharing games (which include
network design games as a special case) that do not depend on the number of players.
1.3 Outline of the paper
In what follows we provide in Section 3 the definition of the selfishness level and show that the self-
ishness level of a finite game can be an arbitrary real number that is unrelated to the price of stability.
Then in Section 4 we provide a characterization that allows us to determine when the selfishness level
of a game is finite. In the case of finite games this boils down to a simple test, namely the existence of
a specific social optimum that we call stable. In particular, the selfishness level of a finite game with a
unique social optimum is finite.
Finally, in Section 5 we compute the selfishness level for some selected games. In particular, the
selfishness level of the n-players Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 1/(2n− 3), and that of the Traveler’s
Dilemma game is 12 . We also show that the selfishness level of finite ordinal potential games is finite,
while those of Cournot competition for n firms (an example of an infinite ordinal potential game) and
of a Tragedy of the Commons game are infinite. Finally, we provide an estimate on the selfishness
level of linear congestion games and fair cost sharing games.
2 Preliminaries
A strategic game (in short, a game) G = (N,{Si}i∈N ,{pi}i∈N) is given by a set N = {1, . . . ,n} of
players, a non-empty set of strategies Si for every player i ∈ N, and a payoff function pi for every
player i ∈ N with pi : S1× . . .×Sn→R. The interpretation is that every player i ∈ N aims at choosing
a strategy si ∈ Si so as to maximize his individual payoff pi(s), where s = (s1, . . . ,sn).
We call s ∈ S1 × . . . × Sn a joint strategy, denote its ith element by si, denote
(s1, . . .,si−1,si+1, . . .,sn) by s−i and similarly with S−i. Further, we write (s′i,s−i) for
(s1, . . .,si−1,s
′
i,si+1, . . .,sn), where we assume that s′i ∈ Si. Sometimes, when focussing on player i
we write (si,s−i) instead of s.
A joint strategy s a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and s′i ∈ Si
pi(si,s−i)≥ pi(s′i,s−i).
Further, given a joint strategy s we call the sum SW(s) := ∑nj=1 p j(s) the social welfare of s. When
the social welfare of s is maximal we call s a social optimum.
2
3 Selfishness level
Given a strategic game G := (N,{Si}i∈N ,{pi}i∈N) and α ≥ 0 we define the game G(α) :=
(N,{Si}i∈N ,{ri}i∈N) by putting
ri(s) := pi(s)+ αSW(s).
So when α > 0 the payoff of each player in the G(α) game depends on the social welfare of the
players. G(α) is then an altruistic version of the game G.
Suppose now that for some α ≥ 0 a Nash equilibrium of G(α) is a social optimum of G(α). Then
we say that G is α-selfish. We define now the selfishness level of a game by a case analysis.
If for no α ≥ 0, G is α-selfish, then we say that its selfishness level is ∞. If for some α ≥ 0, G is
α-selfish and
min
α∈R+
(G is α-selfish)
exists, then we call this minimum the selfishness level of G, and otherwise we stipulate that the self-
ishness level of G is undefined.
Of course, when the game G is finite and for some α ≥ 0, G is α-selfish, the above minimum does
exist. We show below (Theorem 2) that this does not need to be the case when G is infinite, that is, for
some games their selfishness level is undefined.
Note that the social welfare of a joint strategy s in G(α) equals (1 + αn)SW (s), so the social
optima of G and G(α) coincide. Hence we can replace in the above definition the reference to a social
optimum of G(α) by one to a social optimum of G. This is what we shall do in the proofs below.
The above definitions refer to strategic games in which each player i maximizes his payoff function
pi and the social welfare of a joint strategy s is given by SW (s). These definitions obviously apply to
strategic games in which every player i minimizes his cost function ci and the social cost of a joint
strategy s is defined as SC(s) := ∑nj=1 c j(s).
Intuitively, a low selfishness level means that the share of the social welfare needed to induce the
players to choose a social optimum is small. This share can be viewed as an ‘incentive’ needed to
realize a social optimum. Let us illustrate this definition on three simple examples.
Example 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma
C D
C 2,2 0,3
D 3,0 1,1
C D
C 6,6 3,6
D 6,3 3,3
Consider the Prisoner’s Dilemma game G (on the left) and the resulting game G(α) for α = 1 (on
the right). In the latter game the social optimum, (C,C), is also a Nash equilibrium. One can easily
check that for α < 1, (C,C) is also a social optimum of G(α) but not a Nash equilibrium. So the
selfishness level of this game is 1.
Example 2. Battle of the Sexes
F B
F 2,1 0,0
B 0,0 1,2
Here each Nash equilibrium is also a social optimum, so the selfishness level of this game is 0.
Example 3. Matching Pennies
H T
H 1,−1 −1, 1
T −1, 1 1,−1
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Since the social welfare of each joint strategy is 0, for each α the game G(α) is identical to the
original game in which no Nash equilibrium exists. So the selfishness level of this game is ∞. More
generally, the selfishness level of a constant sum game is 0 if it has a Nash equilibrium and otherwise
it is ∞.
Recall that, given a finite game G that has a Nash equilibrium, its price of stability is the ratio
SW(s)/SW (s′) where s is a social optimum and s′ is a Nash equilibrium with the highest social welfare
in G. So the price of stability is 1 iff the selfishness level of G is 0. However, in general there is no
relation between these two notions. The following observation also shows that the selfishness level of
a finite game can be an arbitrary real number.
Theorem 1. For every finite α > 0 and β > 1 there is a finite game whose selfishness level is α and
whose price of stability is β .
Proof. Consider the following generalized form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game G to which we refer
by PD(α,β ):
C D
C 1,1 0,x + 1
D x + 1,0 1β ,
1
β
where x = αα+1 .
In this game and in each game G(γ) with γ ≥ 0, (C,C) is the unique social optimum. To compute
the selfishness level we need to consider a game G(γ) and stipulate that (C,C) is its Nash equilibrium.
This leads to the inequality 1 + 2γ ≥ (γ + 1)(x + 1), from which it follows that γ ≥ x1−x , i.e., γ ≥ α .
So the selfishness level of G is α . Moreover, its price of stability is β . 2
We now use the above games PD(α,β ) to establish the following result showing that for some
games the selfishness level is undefined.
Theorem 2. There exists a game that is α-selfish for every α > 0, but is not 0-selfish.
Proof. We construct a strategic game G = (N,{Si}i∈N ,{pi}i∈N) with two players N = {1,2} by com-
bining, for an arbitrary but fixed β > 1, infinitely many PD(α,β ) games with α > 0 as follows:
For each α > 0 we rename the strategies of the PD(α,β ) game to, respectively, C(α) and D(α)
and denote the corresponding payoff functions by pαi . The set of strategies of each player i ∈ N is
Si = {C(α) | α > 0}∪{D(α) | α > 0} and the payoff of i is defined as
pi(si,s−i) :=
{
pαi (si,s−i) if {si,s−i}⊆{C(α), D(α)} for some α > 0
0 otherwise.
Every social optimum of G is of the form (C(α),C(α)), where α > 0. (Note that we exploit that
β > 1 here.) By the argument given in the proof of Theorem 1, (C(α),C(α)) with α > 0 is a Nash
equilibrium in the game G(α) because the deviations from C(α) to a strategy C(γ) or D(γ) with γ 6= α
yield a payoff of 0. Thus, G is α-selfish for every α > 0. Finally, observe that G is not 0-selfish
because every Nash equilibrium of G is of the form (D(α),D(α)), where α > 0. 2
4 A characterization result
We now characterize the games with a finite selfishness level. To this end we shall need the following
notion. We call a social optimum s stable if for all i ∈ N and s′i ∈ Si the following holds:
if (s′i,s−i) is a social optimum, then pi(si,s−i)≥ pi(s′i,s−i).
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In other words, a social optimum is stable if no player is better off by unilaterally deviating to
another social optimum.
Lemma 1. Consider a strategic game G := (N,{Si}i∈N ,{pi}i∈N) and α ≥ 0.
(i) If s is both a Nash equilibrium of G(α) and a social optimum of G, then s is a stable social
optimum of G.
(ii) If s is a stable social optimum of G, then s is a Nash equilibrium of G(α) iff for all i ∈ N and
s′i ∈ R(i,s)
α ≥
pi(s′i,s−i)− pi(si,s−i)
SW(si,s−i)−SW(s′i,s−i)
where
R(i,s) := {s′i ∈ Si | pi(s′i,s−i) > pi(si,s−i) and SW (si,s−i) > SW(s′i,s−i)}.
Proof.
(i) Suppose that s is both a Nash equilibrium of G(α) and a social optimum of G. Consider some joint
strategy (s′i,s−i) that is a social optimum. By the definition of a Nash equilibrium
pi(si,s−i)+ αSW(si,s−i)≥ pi(s′i,s−i)+ αSW(s′i,s−i),
so pi(si,s−i)≥ pi(s′i,s−i), as desired.
(ii) Suppose that s is a stable social optimum of G. Then s is a Nash equilibrium of G(α) iff for all
i ∈ N and s′i ∈ Si
pi(si,s−i)+ αSW(si,s−i)≥ pi(s′i,s−i)+ αSW(s′i,s−i). (1)
If pi(si,s−i) ≥ pi(s′i,s−i), then (1) holds for all α ≥ 0 since s is a social optimum. If pi(s′i,s−i) >
pi(si,s−i), then, since s is a stable social optimum of G, we have SW(si,s−i) > SW(s′i,s−i).
So (1) holds for all i ∈ N and s′i ∈ Si iff
α ≥
pi(s′i,s−i)− pi(si,s−i)
SW(si,s−i)−SW(s′i,s−i)
holds for all i ∈ N and s′i ∈ R(i,s). 2
This leads us to the following result.
Theorem 3. Consider a strategic game G := (N,{Si}i∈N ,{pi}i∈N).
(i) The selfishness level of G is finite iff a stable social optimum s exists for which
α(s) := max
i∈N, s′i∈R(i,s)
pi(s′i,s−i)− pi(si,s−i)
SW (si,s−i)−SW(s′i,s−i)
is finite.
(ii) If G is finite, then its selfishness level is finite iff it has a stable social optimum. In particular, if
G has a unique social optimum, then its selfishness level is finite.
(iii) If G is finite and has a stable social optimum, then its selfishness level equals mins∈SSO α(s),
where SSO is the set of stable social optima.
(iv) If β > α ≥ 0 and G is α-selfish, then G is β -selfish.
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Proof. (i) and (iv) follow by Lemma 1, (ii) by (i) and (iii) by (ii) and Lemma 1. 2
Using the above theorem we now exhibit a class of games for n players for which the selfishness
level is unbounded. In fact, the following more general result holds.
Theorem 4. For each function f : N→R+ there exists a class of games for n players, where n > 1,
such that the selfishness level of a game for n players equals f (n).
Proof. Assume n > 1 players and that each player has two strategies, 1 and 0. Denote by 1 the joint
strategy in which each strategy equals 1 and by 1−i the joint strategy of the opponents of player i in
which each entry equals 1. The payoff for each player i is defined as follows:
pi(s) :=


0 if s = 1
f (n) if si = 0 and ∀ j < i, s j = 1
− f (n)+1
n−1 otherwise.
So when s 6= 1, pi(s) = f (n) if i is the smallest index of a player with si = 0 and otherwise pi(s) =
− f (n)+1
n−1 . Note that SW (1) = 0 and SW(s) =−1 if s 6= 1. So 1 is a unique social optimum.
We have pi(0,1−i)− pi(1) = f (n) and SW (1)−SW (0,1−i) = 1. So by Theorem 3(iii) the selfish-
ness level equals f (n). 2
5 Examples
We now use the above characterization result to determine or compute an upper bound on the selfish-
ness level of some selected games. First, we exhibit a well-known class of games (see [13]) for which
the selfishness level is finite.
5.1 Potential games
Given a game G := (N,{Si}i∈N ,{pi}i∈N), a function P : S1× . . .Sn→R is called an ordinal potential
function for G if for all i ∈ N, s−i ∈ S−i and si,s′i ∈ Si
pi(si,s−i) > pi(s′i,s−i) iff P(si,s−i) > P(s′i,s−i).
A game that possesses an ordinal potential function is called an ordinal potential game.
Theorem 5. Every finite ordinal potential game has a finite selfishness level.
Proof. Each social optimum with the largest potential is a stable social optimum. So the claim follows
by Theorem 3(ii). 2
In particular, every finite congestion game (see [15]) has a finite selfishness level. We shall derive
explicit bounds for two special cases of these games in Sections 5.7 and 5.8.
5.2 Prisoner’s dilemma for n players
We assume that each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,n} has two strategies, 1 (cooperate) and 0 (defect). We put
pi(s) := 1− si + 2 ∑
j 6=i
s j.
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Proposition 1. The selfishness level of the n-players Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 12n−3 .
Proof. Denote by 1 the joint strategy in which each strategy equals 1. In this game 1 is the unique
social optimum, with for each i ∈ N, pi(1) = 2(n−1) and SW(1) = 2n(n−1).
Consider now the joint strategy s in which player i deviates from 1 to the strategy 0, while the other
players remain at 1. We have then pi(s) = 2(n− 1)+ 1 and SW (s) = 2(n− 1)+ 1 + 2(n−1)(n−2).
Hence
pi(s)− pi(1)
SW(1)−SW(s) =
1
2n−3
The claim now follows by Theorem 1(iii). In particular, for n = 2 we get, as already argued in Exam-
ple 1, that the selfishness level of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma game is 1. 2
5.3 Traveler’s dilemma
This is a strategic game discussed in [2] with two players N = {1,2}, strategy set Si = {2, . . .,100} for
every player i, and payoff function pi for every i defined as
pi(s) :=


si if si = s−i
si + 2 if si < s−i
s−i−2 otherwise.
Proposition 2. The selfishness level of the Traveler’s Dilemma game is 12 .
Proof. The unique social optimum of this game is (100,100), while (2,2) is its unique Nash equilib-
rium.
If player i deviates from the social optimum to a strategy s′i ≤ 99, while the other player remains at
100, the respective payoffs become s′i + 2 and s′i−2, so the social welfare becomes 2s′i. So
pi(s′i,100)− pi(100,100)
SW (100,100)−SW(s′i,100)
=
s′i−98
200−2s′i
The maximum, 12 , is reached when s
′
i = 99. So the claim follows by Theorem 1(iii). 2
5.4 War of attrition
This is a strategic game, see, e.g., [14, Section 3.4], with two players N = {1,2}, strategy set Si = R+
for every player i, and payoff function pi for every i defined as follows, where v > 0
pi(s) :=


−si if si < s−i
1
2 v− si if si = s−i
v− s−i otherwise.
Proposition 3. The selfishness level of the war of attrition game is 0.
Proof. A joint strategy s is a Nash equilibrium iff either s1 = 0 and s2 ≥ v or s2 = 0 and s1 ≥ v. So for
each Nash equilibrium s we have SW(s) = v, i.e., each Nash equilibrium is a social optimum. 2
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5.5 Cournot competition
We consider a symmetric oligopoly Cournot competition with the same linear cost function for all
players. We assume that each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,n} has a strategy set Si = R+ and payoff function
pi(s) := si
(
a−b
n
∑
j=1
s j
)
− csi
for some given a,b,c, where a > c and b > 0.
The price of the product is represented by the expression a− b∑nj=1 s j and the production cost
corresponding to the production level si by csi. In what follows we rewrite the payoff function as
pi(s) := si(d−b∑nj=1 s j), where d := a− c.
Proposition 4. The selfishness level of the n-players Cournot competition game is ∞.
Intuitively, this result means that in this game no matter how much we ‘involve’ the players in
sharing the social welfare we cannot achieve that they will select a social optimum.
Proof. We first determine the stable social optima of this game. Fix a joint strategy s and let t :=
∑nj=1 s j. Then SW (s) = t(d− bt). This expression becomes maximal precisely when t = d2b . So this
game has infinitely many social optima and each of them is stable.
Take now a stable social optimum s. So ∑nj=1 s j = d2b . Fix i ∈ N. Let u := ∑ j 6=i s j . For every
strategy z of player i
pi(z,si) =−bz2 +(d−bu)z
and
SW(z,si) =−bz2 +(d−2bu)z+ u(d−bu).
Denote now si by y and consider a strategy x of player i such that pi(x,s−i) > pi(y,s−i). Then
u + x 6= d2b , so SW(y,s−i) > SW(x,s−i).
We have
pi(x,s−i)− pi(y,s−i) =−b(x2− y2)+ (d−bu)(x− y)
=−b(x− y)(x + y + u− db ) =−b(x− y)(x−
d
2b),
where the last equality holds since u− db =−(y +
d
2b) on the account of the equality u + y =
d
2b .
Further,
SW(y,s−i)−SW(x,s−i) = b(x− y)2− (d−2bu)(x− y)
= b(x− y)(x + y + 2u− db ) = b(x− y)
2,
where the last equality holds since 2u− db =−2y on the account of the equality u + y =
d
2b .
We have x 6= y. Hence
f (x) := pi(x,s−i)− pi(y,s−i)
SW (y,s−i)−SW(x,s−i)
=−
x− d2b
x− y
=−1 +
y− d2b
y− x
.
Since
pi(x,s−i)− pi(y,s−i) = b(y− x)
(
x−
d
2b
)
we have pi(x,s−i)− pi(y,s−i) > 0 iff y < x < d2b or y > x >
d
2b . But y ≤
d
2b , since u + y =
d
2b . So the
conjunction of pi(x,s−i) > pi(y,s−i) and SW(x,s−i) > SW (y,s−i) holds iff y < x < d2b .
Now
max
y<x< d2b
f (x) = ∞.
But s was an arbitrary stable social optimum, so the claim follows by Theorem 3(i). 2
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5.6 Tragedy of the commons
Assume that each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,n} has the real interval [0,1] as its set of strategies. Each
player’s strategy is his chosen fraction of a common resource. Let (see also [14, Exercise 63.1] and
[18, pages 6–7]):
pi(s) := max
(
0,si
(
1−
n
∑
j=1
s j
))
.
This payoff function reflects the fact that player’s enjoyment of the common resource depends
positively from his chosen fraction of the resource and negatively from the total fraction of the common
resource used by all players. Additionally, if the total fraction of the common resource by all players
exceeds a feasible level, here 1, then player’s enjoyment of the resource becomes zero.
Proposition 5. The selfishness level of the n-players Tragedy of the Commons game is ∞.
Proof. We first determine the stable social optima of this game. Fix a joint strategy s and let t :=
∑nj=1 s j. If t > 1, then the social welfare is 0. So assume that t ≤ 1. Then SW(s) = t(1− t). This
expression becomes maximal precisely when t = 12 and then it equals
1
4 . So this game has infinitely
many social optima and each of them is stable.
Take now a stable social optimum s. So ∑nj=1 s j = 12 . Fix i ∈ {1, . . .,n}. Denote si by a and
consider a strategy x of player i such that pi(x,s−i) > pi(a,s−i). Then ∑ j 6=i s j +x 6= 12 , so SW (a,s−i) >
SW(x,s−i).
We have pi(a,s−i) = a2 and SW(a,s−i) =
1
4 . Further, pi(x,s−i) > pi(a,s−i) implies ∑ j 6=i s j + x < 1
and hence
pi(x,s−i) = x
(
a +
1
2
− x
)
and
SW(x,s−i) =
(1
2
−a + x
)(
1−
1
2
+ a− x
)
=
1
4
− (a− x)2.
Also x 6= a. Hence
f (x) := pi(x,s−i)− pi(a,s−i)
SW(a,s−i)−SW(x,s−i)
=
(a− x)(x− 12)
(a− x)2
=
x− 12
a− x
=−1 +
a− 12
a− x
Since
pi(x,s−i)− pi(a,s−i) = (a− x)
(
x−
1
2
)
we have pi(x,s−i) > pi(a,s−i) iff a < x < 12 or a > x >
1
2 . But a ≤
1
2 , since ∑ j 6=i s j + a = 12 . So the
conjunction of pi(x,s−i) > pi(a,s−i) and SW(x,s−i) < SW(a,s−i) holds iff a < x < 12 .
Now
max
a<x< 12
f (x) = ∞.
But s was an arbitrary stable social optimum, so the claim follows by Theorem 3(i). 2
5.7 Linear congestion games
In a congestion game (see [15]) G = (N,E,{Si}i∈N ,{de}e∈E) we are given a set of players N =
{1, . . . ,n}, a set of facilities E with a delay function de : N→Q for every facility e ∈ E , and a strategy
set Si ⊆ 2E for every player i ∈ N. For a joint strategy s ∈ S1×·· ·×Sn, define xe(s) as the number of
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players using facility e ∈ E , i.e., xe(s) = |{i∈ N : e ∈ si}|. The goal of a player is to minimize his indi-
vidual cost ci(s) = ∑e∈si de(xe(s)). The social cost function is given by SC(s) = ∑ni=1 ci(s). In a linear
congestion game, the delay function of every facility e ∈ E is of the form de(x) = aex + be, where
ae,be ∈ Q+ are non-negative rational numbers. Using standard scaling arguments, we can assume
without loss of generality that ae,be ∈ N.
Given a linear congestion game, we define L as the maximum number of facilities that any
player can choose, i.e., L := maxi∈N, si∈Si |si|. Moreover, let ∆max := maxe∈E(ae + be) and ∆min :=
mine∈E(ae + be).
Proposition 6. The selfishness level of a linear congestion game is at most 12 (L ·∆max−∆min−1).
Note that |L| ≤ |E|, so the exhibited bound does not depend on the number of players.
Proof. Let s be a stable social optimum. Note that s exists by Theorems 3(ii) and 5. Because we
consider a cost minimization game here the condition in Theorem 3(i) reads
α(s) := max
i∈{1,...,n}, s′i∈R(i,s)
ci(si,s−i)− ci(s
′
i,s−i)
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(si,s−i)
, (2)
where
R(i,s) := {s′i ∈ Si | ci(s′i,s−i) < ci(si,s−i) and SC(s′i,s−i) > SC(si,s−i)}.
Fix some player i and let s′ = (s′i,s−i) for some s′i ∈ R(i,s). We use xe and x′e to refer to xe(s) and
xe(s
′), respectively. Note that
x′e =


xe + 1 if e ∈ s′i \ si,
xe−1 if e ∈ si \ s′i,
xe otherwise.
(3)
Exploiting (3), we obtain
ci(si,s−i)− ci(s
′
i,s−i) = ∑
e∈si
(aexe + be)− ∑
e∈s′i
(aex
′
e + be)
= ∑
e∈si\s′i
(aexe + be)− ∑
e∈s′i\si
(ae(xe + 1)+ be).
Similarly,
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(si,s−i) = ∑
e∈E
x′e(aex
′
e + be)− ∑
e∈E
xe(aexe + be)
= ∑
e∈s′i\si
(xe + 1)(ae(xe + 1)+ be)− xe(aexe + be)
+ ∑
e∈si\s′i
(xe−1)(ae(xe−1)+ be)− xe(aexe + be)
= ∑
e∈s′i\si
(ae(2xe + 1)+ be)− ∑
e∈si\s′i
(ae(2xe−1)+ be).
Given a congestion vector x = (xe)e∈E , define P(x) := ∑e∈si\s′i(aexe +be) and Q(x) := ∑e∈s′i\si(ae(xe +
1)+ be). Note that P(x) and Q(x) are integers because ae,be ∈ N for every facility e ∈ E . Note that
with these definitions, P(1) = ∑e∈si\s′i(ae + be) and Q(0) = ∑e∈s′i\si(ae + be). We have
ci(si,s−i)− ci(s
′
i,s−i)
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(si,s−i)
=
P(x)−Q(x)
2Q(x)−Q(0)−2P(x)+ P(1).
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Because s′i ∈ R(i,s), we know that P(x) > Q(x) and 2Q(x)−Q(0) > 2P(x)−P(1). So we obtain
Q(x)+ 1≤ P(x)≤Q(x)+ 1
2
(P(1)−Q(0)−1).
Exploting these inequalities, we obtain
P(x)−Q(x)
2Q(x)−Q(0)−2P(x)+ P(1) ≤ Q(x)+
1
2
(P(1)−Q(0)−1)−Q(x)
=
1
2
(P(1)−Q(0)−1)
=
1
2
(
∑
e∈si\s′i
(ae + be)− ∑
e∈s′i\si
(ae + be)−1
)
≤
1
2
(|si \ s
′
i| ·∆max−|s′i \ si| ·∆min−1).
Note that |s′i \si| ≥ 1; otherwise, s′i ⊆ si and thus SC(s′i,s−i)≤ SC(s) which contradicts s′i ∈ R(i,s). The
above expression is thus at most
1
2
(L ·∆max−∆min−1).
Because this bound holds for every player i and s′i ∈ R(i,s), we conclude by Theorem 3(iii) that the
selfishness level α is at most 12(L ·∆max−∆min−1). 2
Proposition 6 is tight for certain values of L, ∆max and ∆min. As an example, it yields an upper
bound of n− 1 for L = 1, ∆max = 2n and ∆min = 1, which is tight as the following example shows.
Consider a symmetric congestion game with 2n players and two facilities e1 and e2 with delay func-
tions x and 2n, respectively. Clearly, a socially optimal strategy profile s splits the 2n players evenly
among the facilities and has cost SC(s) = n2 +2n2 = 3n2. Consider a player i that uses facility e2. We
have ci(s) = 2n. If i switches to facility e1, we obtain SC(s′i,s−i) = (n+1)2 +2n(n−1) = 3n2 +1 and
ci(s
′
i,s−i) = n + 1. Thus
α ≥
ci(s)− ci(s
′
i,s−i)
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(s)
= n−1.
5.8 Fair cost sharing games
In a fair cost sharing game players allocate facilities and share the cost of the used facilities in a
fair manner. Formally, a fair cost sharing game is given by G = (N,E,{Si}i∈N ,{ce}e∈E), where N =
{1, . . . ,n} is the set of players, E is the set of facilities, Si ⊆ 2E is the set of facility subsets available to
player i, and ce ∈Q+ is the cost of facility e ∈ E . As for congestion games, we let xe(s) be the number
of players using facility e ∈ E in a joint strategy s ∈ S1×·· ·×Sn. The cost of a facility e ∈ E is evenly
shared among the players using it. That is, the cost of player is defined as ci(s) = ∑e∈si ce/xe(s). The
social cost function is given by SC(s) = ∑ni=1 ci(s). Using standard scaling arguments, we can assume
without loss of generality that ce ∈ N.
Given a cost sharing game, we define L as the maximum number of facilities that any player can
choose, i.e., L := maxi∈N, si∈Si |si|. Moreover, let cmax := maxe∈E ce.
Proposition 7. The selfishness level of a fair cost sharing game is at most 12 L · cmax−1.
Note that |L| ≤ |E|, so the exhibited bound does not depend on the number of players.
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Proof. Let s be a stable social optimum. Note that s exists by Theorems 3(ii) and 5. Fix some player
i and let s′ = (s′i,s−i) for some s′i ∈ R(i,s). We use xe and x′e to refer to xe(s) and xe(s′), respectively. It
is not difficult to verify that
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(si,s−i) = ∑
e∈s′i :x
′
e=1
ce
x′e
− ∑
e∈si:xe=1
ce
xe
.
By definition, we have
ci(si,s−i)− ci(s
′
i,s−i) = ∑
e∈si
ce
xe
− ∑
e∈s′i
ce
x′e
.
Thus
ci(si,s−i)− ci(s
′
i,s−i)
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(si,s−i)
=
∑e∈si :xe≥2 cexe −∑e∈s′i:x′e≥2
ce
x′e
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(si,s−i)
−1.
Note that the denominator is at least 1 because s′i ∈ R(i,s) and each ce belongs to N. We conclude
ci(si,s−i)− ci(s
′
i,s−i)
SC(s′i,s−i)−SC(si,s−i)
≤ ∑
e∈si:xe≥2
ce
xe
−1≤ 1
2
L · cmax−1.
The claim follows by Theorem 3(iii). 2
6 Conclusions
We presented in this paper a new discrepancy measure between the social welfare in a Nash equilib-
rium and in a social optimum, that we call the selfishness level. In contrast to the concepts of price of
anarchy and price of stability this measure is normative in that it indicates by what fraction of altruism
the original game needs to be modified to achieve a desired situation.
The proposed measure can be also used for other games and for other solution concepts, for in-
stance extensive games and subgame perfect equilibria. As an example consider the six-period version
of the centipede game (see, e.g., [14]) depicted in Figure 1.
1 2 1 2 1 2
(6,5)
(1,0) (0,2) (3,1) (2,4) (5,3) (4,6)
C C C C C C
S S S S S S
Figure 1: A centipede game.
In its unique subgame perfect equilibrium each player chooses S in every period and the resulting
payoffs are (1,0). Since 5 + (6 + 5)α ≥ 6 + (4 + 6)α holds iff α ≥ 1, we can conclude that the
(appropriately adapted) selfishness level for this game is 1.
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